2 respective places in the hierarchy that each of these cities receives is spotty at best.
Glaucon simply announces his verdict after hearing the descriptions of all five cities, 4 and it is left for the reader to decide which features of the descriptions were responsible for that verdict. This has led many scholars to question some of the details of this ranking, with most attention being directed at accounting for the relatively low position of the democratic city and soul.
5 By contrast there has been little to no concern displayed over the timocrat's relatively high position in the ranking, yet precisely this requires and deserves careful consideration.
The timocrat, after all, seems to embody precisely the attitude towards morality that we find Plato vigorously attacking both in the Republic and in other dialogues. For the timocrat, we are told, is ruled by his spirited part of soul, which is characterized by its desire for honor and respect and its aversion to shame. 6 This means that the timocratic man captures the spirit of the Homeric hero, and the world seen through timocratic eyes is very much like the Homeric "shame-culture." 7 But it is precisely such shame-based morality that Plato often singles out for criticism. 8 timocrat is said "not to be pure with respect to virtue"; and at 554e4-6 the oligarch is said to be "more graceful" (cf. 400c8-10) even though he does not achieve "the true virtue of the one-minded and harmonious soul."
4 Rep. 580b6-8. 5 Perhaps the most well-known such discussion is Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 130ff. A well-balanced examination of the order of the degenerate constitutions is Dorthea Frede, "Die ungerechten Verfassungen und die ihnen entsprechenden Menschen", in Platon Politeia, ed. Otfried Höffe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997), 251-70. Frede does a good job in particular of dispelling historical misunderstandings of Plato's thesis. 6 For a full discussion of the connection between the thumos, honor and shame, see Douglas Cairns, 3
There seem to be three related reasons for his contempt for such an approach to morality. First, since an agent's own values will be determined by what will win (or cost) him the respect of his fellow citizens, one's moral views are effectively derived from the fortuitous opinions of others. If they think it is shameful not to return what one owes, this will be reflected in one's own set of values; if they don't, it won't.
Moreover, these values are often taken up in a rather unreflective manner, and to this extent we may see shame-culture morality as one of the major targets of the early dialogues, where Socrates is looking to get his interlocutors to examine their inherited beliefs. Finally, shame-based morality tends to produce a moral attitude that limits one's concerns to appearing moral rather than actually being moral. If one's motivation is to gain respect and to avoid shame, and if one's fellow citizens believe stealing to be shameful, then one will refrain from stealing only when one believes others might witness the theft. 9 Let us refer to these as the problems of fortuity, intellectual passivity, and duplicity respectively.
Some explanation, therefore, is needed for placing this seemingly dubious moral character next in line after the philosopher-king. Surely, it is not enough to say that the timocrat's position is simply due to his soul being ruled by the second-best part, namely thumos. The question goes deeper than that. Throughout the Republic the second-best status of the spirited part has been consistently defended by pointing to its utility as an ally to reason, but with the introduction of the timocrat the question is raised whether the spirited part possesses any moral worth of its own, even when it is not serving reason. After all, one might think that, just as honor itself loses all value when divorced from the good and wisdom, 10 so too does the honor-loving part ed. Theo Kobusch and Burkhard Mojsisch (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996) , 47-63.
9 B. Williams insists that even in Homeric culture shame is not only triggered by possible reactions by others, but also has been internalized to some extent (in Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 74-102) . In other words, he sees the Greek aidôs as covering both shame and guilt (90), in contrast to, e.g., Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, 17. For now we may pass over the question of whether we are doing Homeric shame-culture justice by describing its conception of shame as being exclusively externally directed, since our focus right now is on the timocrat of Books 8-9, whom Plato very clearly characterizes as being rather duplicitous indeed . I shall return to the question of internalization below.
10 Apol. 30b2-4; Euthydemus 279a-281c; cf. Meno 87e-88d; Phaedo 82c2-8.
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of soul become worthless without the supervision of the good-loving and knowledgeloving part. An adequate response will, then, require nothing less than an account of the nature and value of the thumos itself along with its characteristic desire for esteem, and I believe we would do well by starting our examination of the thumos by comparing the two very different figures of the auxiliary and the timocrat. As I shall aim to show, these figures represent radically different conceptions of second-best morality.
The Timocrat and the Auxiliary
The timocrat and the auxiliary have sometimes been identified by scholars on account of their connection to the spirited part of soul. ("Imperfect Virtue") who stresses some important differences between the timocrat and the auxiliary thinks that the latter is also an "honor-lover" (e.g., 316). In my opinion this causes some problems for her main thesis that the auxiliaries choose virtue for its own sake, since she ends up having to say that they "value virtue as honorable" but that they nevertheless "value justice for its own sake" (338).
5 to correspond to a part of the soul, 17 with the guardians corresponding to reason, the auxiliaries to spirit and the craftsmen and farmers to the appetitive part, and the auxiliaries' correspondence to spirit must be understood to mean that they are ruled by spirit.
The details of the early education, 18 however, make plain that the auxiliaries cannot be described as being ruled by spirit. For both the guardians and the auxiliaries complete the education in mousikê and gymnastikê described in Books 2 and 3, 19 and the whole point of this education is to create a harmony among the parts of the educated person's soul such that reason rules, obediently supported by the spirited part, over the appetites. 20 Those who think that the auxiliaries are ruled by spirit presumably try to rewrite this description of the education in such a way that the auxiliaries' spirit is educated to obey not its own reason but that of the guardians. For this understanding of the education allows one simultaneously to maintain that the education makes spirit obedient to reason and yet that nothing internal to the auxiliary's own soul rules over its spirited part. For support defenders of this view might point to Rep. IX 590c-d:
Therefore, to insure that someone like that is ruled by something similar to what rules the best person, we say that he ought to be the slave of that best person who has a divine ruler within himself. It isn't to harm the slave that we say he must be ruled, which is what Thrasymachus thought to be true of all subjects, but because it is better for everyone to be ruled by divine reason, preferably within himself and his own, otherwise imposed from without, so that as far as possible we all will be alike and friends governed by the same thing.
21
But this passage is far from saying that the only rational part ruling over the auxiliary's spirit is that of the guardians. The explicit subject of this passage is not the auxiliary but the farmers and craftsmen. The "someone like this" (ho toioutos) at 17 Rep. 441c4-6.
18 Throughout this paper 'education' refers exclusively to the education in mousikê and gumnastikê as described in Books 2 and 3 of the Rep. There is no need to consider the mathematical and dialectical education of Book 7 here, since it does not concern the auxiliaries. 6 590c7 picks up on banausia and kheirotekhnia at 590c1. This is also clear from the Socrates' demand that they be "slaves" to the rulers -even in the qualified sense articulated here -since it is only the class of iron and bronze souled workers that is routinely associated with slaves. 22 Moreover, the sequel to this passage also 30 One might urge in response that the philotimos is not entirely indiscriminate, and this would surely be right. He happily accepts the praise of inferior people only when the praise of superior people is out of reach, and of course this makes good intuitive sense. Just because the glutton won't refuse any kind of food doesn't mean that he never prefers one food to another, and we should expect these preferences to be similar to anyone else's. If offered the choice between a chef salad and a bowl of flour, he will probably choose the former, but he would surely eat the latter if that were the best thing on the menu. The philotimos must make similar choices since it is hardly always possible to win the praise of both the better and the worse members of society. And so the auxiliary, although strictly speaking desiring all kinds of honor, would in practice only pursue honor from the guardians. This, however, is not only a less charitable interpretation of the auxiliaries, it also flies in the face of the previous argument: They cannot be philotimos because their spirited part is not in control. We may now conclude from this brief examination that the auxiliaries and the guardians have the same hierarchical structure to their souls: thanks to the education in mousikê and gymnastikê reason is in charge, supported by spirit, ruling over appetite. What, then, distinguishes the auxiliaries from the guardians? The difference is rooted in their natural constitutions. The gold-souled guardians are born with a different set of natural abilities, which can be seen primarily in their superior intelligence. This concerns, then, not a stronger or weaker spirited part but a more or less capable rational part. The auxiliaries do not possess a rational part that is adequate to engage properly in higher academic pursuits, as the philosopher-rulers are the only ones who successfully advance through the mathematical and dialectical education. . Although Plato does occasionally describe how honors will be apportioned in the city, these honors are not directed at the auxiliaries more than at the guardians. On the contrary, the guardians are the ones who are said to receive the greatest honors. This is because both guardians and auxiliaries share robust spirited parts of soul.
32 Rep. 537b8-9, d3-4
33 Rep. 375e8-10, 535b1-3. 34 Just as not all who complete the education in mousikê and gymnastikê will go on to do mathematics (537b-c), so too not all who complete mathematics will be selected to do dialectic (537c-d).
9 circumstances they will abandon the beliefs acquired during the education. We are then told that the auxiliaries are the ones who do not pass all of these tests. This is striking because it is precisely the auxiliaries' ability to preserve their beliefs "under all conditions" 35 about what is to be feared or not that is repeatedly stressed as their characteristic virtue of courage. 36 The only way I can see to reconcile these two statements is to take the domain of the beliefs in the latter statement seriously:
pleasures, pains, fears and desires might influence the auxiliaries' beliefs on other matters, but not about the proper objects of fear. 37 This amounts to saying that while both the guardians and the auxiliaries have been educated in mousikê and gymnastikê, this education has been more effective in the guardians' case. Nevertheless, the shortfalls of the auxiliaries' education should not be exaggerated. A harmony is created in their souls too, which means that reason is ruling over appetites, but under certain conditions this harmony is disrupted, allowing lower impulses to alter their beliefs (though not those beliefs concerned with the objects of fear). 38 In short, the auxiliaries' souls share the same hierarchical structure that the guardians' souls have, since this is the whole point of the education in mousikê and gymnastikê, and from this it follows that both classes are lovers of truth and wisdom. The critical differences 35 dia pantos 429b9, c8, 430b9. In 429c8-d1 Socrates explains that by "under all conditions" he has pains, pleasures, desires and fears in mind.
36 429a-c; 433c; cf. 442c. 37 Presumably this means that they preserve the beliefs described in Rep. 386a-388e, where Socrates describes how the education ought to shape their views on fear, while they would not necessarily under all circumstances preserve the other beliefs inculcated in the education, e.g., those beliefs concerned with the proper attitude towards money, food, drink and sex (389dff.) nor perhaps the beliefs about the gods (379aff.). But there are still some difficulties here that I think have not been sufficiently appreciated. For one thing, it is not clear to me that these domains are really all that distinct, mostly because anything can be described as a possible object of fear (or excluded from this class), e.g., ignorance, lawlessness, poverty. We are told, for example, that "losing money or something else of this sort" (sterêthênai khrêmatôn ê allou tou tôn toioutôn) is something they would fear least of all (387e4-5), which seems to cross over into the other domain. Further, obedience to the rulers seems to be something that is characteristic of the auxiliaries (440d, 458b-c), but while promoting obedience to the rulers is indeed part of the education, it is not described in terms of fear, nor does its description occur in the section of the education outlining the objects of fear (386a-388e); rather it falls under the section on moderation and controlling appetites (389d). 38 Plato describes a similar scenario at Phaedo 81b1-c2.
are that the harmony of the auxiliaries' souls contains certain fault-lines, and that although both are lovers of wisdom, they differ in how they express this love.
Whereas the guardian rulers have the ability to satisfy this desire for truth fully by going out and discovering the truth themselves, the auxiliaries' limited rational abilities allow them to express this desire only to a limited degree, by adopting certain true beliefs from the guardians and preserving them.
39
It is worth emphasizing that by acknowledging that the auxiliary has the same structure of soul as the guardian, Plato is giving the term "virtue" a wider and more generous scope than has previously been thought. He is allowing for individuals who do not possess first-rate intellectual abilities to train and harmonize their souls in such a way that reason is in charge. Moreover, it follows from his psychological definitions of the four virtues that while the auxiliary is not wise, he may fairly be called courageous, moderate and just. He is just since each part of his soul is performing its proper task, and he is also moderate since the education has created homodoxia in his soul regarding which part should rule and which part should be 39 This theme of testing for fault-lines continues throughout Book 7. Final tests are applied even after the mathematical and dialectic training (539e). Likewise, not all of those who begin the mathematical and dialectical education are intellectually in a position to complete it. Certainly all of those whose progression halts due to either a lack of intellectual power or such psychological fault-lines become auxiliaries. Thus, Book 7 is in general agreement with 412-14 regarding the critical differences, though it also makes clear that the auxiliaries are not equally intellectually deficient, with some progressing further than others, though none making it all the way to the Good.
I would like to place particular emphasis on the fact that these auxiliaries, precisely because they do not know the Good, will still be dependent on the guardians as a source of their true opinions.
But this should not mislead us into thinking that their own reason is not in control. The issue of whether one's reason is in fact ruling is distinct from the question of whether one's reason is a selfsufficient ruler. Moreover, one whose reason is in control while receiving expert advice is miles away from one whose reason is not in control but who is rather subject to the control of an external rational agent. This can be seen from the reasons for action that the external agent would supply in each case.
A physician, for example, has to rule over a child's appetites for him by telling him that the medicine tastes good, since the child's life is oriented towards pleasure, whereas it suffices to tell the rational patient that taking medicine is the right thing to do. Thus, while the guardians simply rule over the bronze and iron souled individuals, they merely assist the auxiliaries rule themselves.
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ruled. 40 He is also courageous since the education ensures that his spirited part preserves reason's declarations on the proper objects of fear.
41
The auxiliary, therefore, is someone whose reason is in control without being quite up to philosophical standards in terms of its ability to engage in intellectual activity, and he represents the model of imperfect virtue to which those not blessed with first-rate rational faculties should aspire. By contrast, the four degenerate cities and souls aim to represent four other kinds of moral agent that one who is naturally fitted to become a philosopher might become instead. Hence, the democrat occasionally does philosophy, and we can surely infer from the account of how the tyrant maneuvers into and remains in power that the tyrant is extremely clever.
Socrates' discussion of justice in the Republic is, after all, aimed at the immediate audience gathered in Polemarchus' house, namely Adeimantus, Glaucon, Thrasymachus, Polemarchus, and the rest, and it is doubtful that any of these men 40 Rep. 442c9-d7 (cf. 433a8-b4). In fact, there is some tension here between their possession of homodoxia and their performance on the tests for guardianship. As we saw above, some (perhaps all)
auxiliaries are said to fail certain tests relating to intense (cf. 413e1 basanizontas polu mallon ê khuson en puri) pleasures, pains and fears, and this surely amounts to a deficiency in moderation. Here again I am inclined to say that by exaggerating the auxiliaries' shortfalls we risk overlooking an important moral category, namely that of those individuals who generally -apart from extreme circumstancesretain rational control over themselves. See following note. 41 Rep. 442b10-c2. Plato is often understood to be advancing a theory of the unity of the virtues here such that none of the other three virtues can exist without wisdom. On this understanding, the auxiliary is not just because his reason is not performing its proper task, which is to be wise and know the good, nor is he even courageous because courage is taken to be the "preservation in the face of pleasures and interpretation. The definition of courage, for example, simply requires that reason's dictates on the objects of fear be preserved, with no indication that the dictating reason must be wise. Such latitude is indeed desirable, since it would be unreasonable to suppose that intellectual brilliance is a necessary condition for this harmonious relationship of the parts, and those non-philosophers who do manage to achieve this harmonious relation seem deserving of terms of moral approval, especially since most moral agents will fall into this class of non-philosophers. One might argue that one of the benefits of the tripartite soul along with this psychological account of the virtues is that Plato is now in the welcome position of being able to account for the virtuous behavior of non-philosophers.
while listening to the discussion of the Kallipolis and its citizens, were imagining that his position would be merely that of an auxiliary. 42 The timocrat, therefore, is presented as the second-best type of moral agent that such a sufficiently rational person can become. By contrast, the auxiliary represents the best kind of moral agent that the second-best kind of person, i.e., one whose intellect is only second-rate, can become.
The Education of the Spirited Part
The question remains how the auxiliary can be said to correspond to the spirited part if he is not ruled by it. This might just be a point on which the analogy between the city and the individual breaks down. After all, if the analogy is to be taken strictly, the auxiliaries wouldn't have rational and appetitive parts at all.
Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that the auxiliary is not likened to the spirited part per se but to a spirited part that has been educated by mousikê and gymnastikê.
We must then take a closer look at what education is supposed to achieve in the spirited part of soul. Theory, at 330n28). For example, we are told that the latter power is absent in children (441a7-b1) while the former must be present in children since it is one of the targets of the education. An identification with qualifications is necessary, therefore, and I suggest we understand the to philomathes to be the proto-rational part or power of soul -the part that becomes rational with maturity. One interesting corollary of this suggestion is that when reason ultimately enters the scene, it is not a tabula rasa; rather, it already has a number of opinions that it acquired during its proto-rational gestation. Moreover, the internalization view would seem to cause serious psychological problems. Say a guardian's spirited part does internalize some ideal that dictates how it should act in a certain situation, e.g., when asked a question his spirited part dictates that he ought to tell the truth because doing so accords with its internalized ideals.
There will inevitably be situations where this spirited dictate is opposed by reason, since telling the truth is not invariably the right thing to do. 60 But such opposition would become problematic because even in the guardians, the thumos appears the stronger part of soul, 61 so that any such genuine opposition between reason and spirit would risk ending in mutiny.
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Finally, the internalization view leads to a very implausible understanding of the Odysseus example and simply contradicts the details of the Leontius case-study. 57 399a-c; cf. 400a1. 58 In other words, the three parts of soul are unified by two intermediates. Reason and spirit are unified by mousikê whose one part (content) is directed at reason and whose other part (melody and rhythm) is directed at spirit, while spirit and appetite are united by gymnastikê, whose athletic part is directed at spirit and whose life-style part is directed at appetite. 59 One might still question whether the proto-rational part is really receiving an ideal concept of self as opposed to acquiring beliefs about what is right and wrong. Socrates' concern for how and when first person narratives are employed in the education (392cff.) does suggest some sense of self is in the making.
60 Rep. 331c8. 61 Ruling in the Republic is emphatically not a function of strength. This is obvious in the case of the city, where the auxiliaries are clearly the strongest class, but it is also made rather clear for the soul, as well. There is no mention of weakening the spirit in the education, for example. Rather, it must be strengthened, since it is reason's ally. Moreover, if strength and rule were to go hand in hand, then the guardian's reason should never need spirit's help, since this would indicate that reason is weaker than appetite and hence not in control. 62 One might object that reason will prevail as long as the spirited part has been made obedient to reason, but once this powerful part obsessed with honor is granted its own conception of what is honorable and shameful, it is not clear to me that it can be made obedient to anything else.
For according to this view, the opposition between reason and spirit is supposed to be generated in the following way. Odysseus, while trying to get comfortable sleeping on the floor of the portico of his own home, witnesses the prelude to some licentious games to be played out by Penelope's maids and the suitors to his wife and gets upset because the spirited part's own sense of propriety has been offended. 63 But surely Odysseus is understandably upset, which is to say that he is rationally justified in regarding these circumstances as deplorable. In other words the view under consideration explains the opposition between reason and spirit by attributing to each opposed opinions and ideals, but I fail to see how Odysseus could not rationally believe that these goings-on are shameful. The case of Leontius drives this point home. 64 The internalization view would have it that Leontius's spirited part houses a conception of his ideal self which is opposed to ogling corpses so that when he does give in to the temptation to do so, it gets upset and angry. 65 But this is not how Plato explains the example:
"Besides don't we often notice in other cases that when appetite forces someone contrary to rational calculation, he reproaches himself and gets angry with that in him that's doing the forcing, so that of the two factions that are fighting a civil war, so to speak, spirit allies itself with reason?"
66
It is rather reason's ideals that are being transgressed and not the spirited part's. 67 In light of all of these problems, it might be better to look for an alternative understanding of the spirited part and its education.
Consider, therefore, this alternative. The spirited part is essentially social and other-directed; it is wholly dependent on the views of others. This understanding of the education of the thumos not only effectively deals
with the three problems associated with the spirited part's love of honor and aversion to shame outlined above, but it also seems to capture a larger Platonic trend. One of Socrates' aims in the Gorgias, for example, is to criticize his interlocutor's attachment to public opinions on moral matters and in particular their disposition to feel shame at contradicting these opinions. This is the problem of fortuity introduced above. Yet his aim in this dialogue is not to scorn the all too human pre-occupation with esteem and shame. Rather, he rejects only its externally directed focus, and he wishes to As she suggests, "assigning motivations to distinct and evaluatively loaded personae facilitates disowning some of one's motivations and identifying with others" (185) and in this way is meant to influence our behavior. To this I would merely want to add that this is directed primarily at the spirited part. By describing the collection of the soul's parts as a kind of social community containing "evaluatively loaded personae" Plato helps the spirited part see the soul itself as a self-sufficient arena for the achievement of esteem.
69 Gorg. 522c7-d7 (Zeyl trans. slightly revised). It has been suggested to me by a sympathetic audience member that the sense of this last line (kai monos hupo monou) might be much stronger: "and even alone [refuted] by myself." This is clearly a welcome suggestion, but it does not seem to be the most obvious way of understanding such phrases involving the repetition of forms of monos (cf. Plato Symp.
What Socrates seems to be suggesting here is a radical reprogramming of our aversion to shame. It should be triggered not by the fortuitous opinions of one's fellow citizens but by the reliable verdict of reason. 70 We might see this redirection of shame as a likely consequence of Plato's views on moral expertise. For one should care only about the opinions of the relevant experts, but there do not seem to be any experts in morality. This gap in public knowledge, however, is filled in a way by reason and the processes of elenchus and dialectic, which aim to establish right opinion and knowledge 71 and which therefore should be the new focus of our concern for esteem.
This intellectual reprogramming of our concern for esteem also solves the problems of intellectual passivity and duplicity. If one's own reason is the esteemed observer, then one is never in a position to be duplicitous, nor is this necessarily intellectually passive, since one's reason might well have acquired its beliefs through rigorous reflection and examination.
Such an understanding of the spirited part could also accommodate the examples discussed above. Odysseus' inclination to anger can be explained without assuming that the thumos has internalized a conception of its ideal self. Odysseus is in a difficult position because he believes both that that the behavior he is witnessing is insulting and that rectifying this situation requires waiting for the right moment.
These are both rational beliefs, which is to say they are present in the rational part of 
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his soul. His spirited part of soul, being essentially other-directed, is looking to and, as it were, pursuing the honor and praise of his rational part. The conflict between reason and spirit comes about because the latter has a difficult time dealing with the former's beliefs. The spirited part only has ears for reason's beliefs concerning honor and shame, and so the belief that the current situation is insulting is going to evoke a spirited response in a way that the belief that the time to set things right is later will not. This leads to a conflict between reason and spirit. Recall that it was difficult to see how on the internalization view a forceful spirited part in possession of its own internalized ideals could ever be subdued by reason in those cases where their two ideals conflict. Yet that is exactly what Odysseus accomplishes in Socrates' example, and this externally directed conception of the thumos provides an easy explanation of how this is possible. He simply has to call to mind that it would be more shameful not to behave rationally. Moreover, this reading of the Odysseus example would seem to be confirmed by the Leontius example, which as we saw above does not make use of any evaluative content housed in the spirited part of the soul.
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The education of the spirited part of soul might be summed up as follows.
The spirited part is essentially social and other-directed, and for this reason its education is focused on directing its gaze rather than getting it to internalize certain ideals. An uneducated spirited part naturally directs its focus to all external onlookers, including its own reason, 73 with the aim of winning their respect. Plato does not offer any psychological details as to how the spirited part manages to discern either reason's views or those of other people; he is more interested in outlining how we must deal with the spirited part given that it does do this. What we must do is train it to direct all of its attention to reason so that feelings of shame and pride are 72 Rep. 440a9-b4 and cf. 442b10-c2. Leontius' case has been offered as support for the claim that the thumos is not only interested in the esteem bestowed by others, but also has the internal capacity for self-esteem (e.g., Cairns, Aidôs, 383; Cooper, "Plato's Theory of Human Motivation," 19-21), since
Leontius' drama appears to be played out in the absence of any audience. Burnyeat ("The Truth of
Tripartition") has resisted this, insisting that the thumos is essentially social and other-directed, so that "we have to suppose one or more onlookers who also heard him denounce his base desires" (11). I would suggest that Burnyeat is right about the thumos being "essentially social", but it is enough to admit that reason is an onlooker. 
Timocratic Virtue
Whereas the auxiliary is someone whose spirited part is for the most part responsive to the judgments of his reason, with the timocrat spirit rules over reason and seeks the esteem primarily of the rulers, whoever they might be, and to a lesser extent that of the general public. 75 This psychological constitution makes the timocrat a problematic figure. As we have seen in the introduction, he has a duplicitous character and his moral views, if we might call them that, are a product of the whims of society. Why, then, does this figure occupy the second position in the hierarchy of virtue and vice? The answer surely has something to do with the structure of his soul -that spirit is in charge rather than appetite -but why should the timocratic psychological structure be ethically superior to the oligarch's, for whom appetite is in charge?
It cannot be because the timocrat possesses more of the four cardinal virtues than the oligarch, since as the four virtues are defined psychologically in Book 4 the timocrat, unlike the auxiliary, cannot possibly possess any of them. and in a genuinely moral life these two must be brought together in a reliable manner.
Only one motivational structure allows for this -the one in which the dominant desire for knowledge and good is ultimately coupled with the knowledge (or opinion in the case of the auxiliaries) of what is good. 87 None of the degenerate souls, therefore, can lay claim to this objective side, and this is surely one of the reasons why Plato 86 One also might be tempted to object that the oligarch is equally concerned with others' evaluative judgments insofar as, e.g., market forces are a function of people's desires. Without giving a full analysis of this matter, the following observations should serve to cast serious doubt on this suggestion.
First, the oligarch is not looking to acquire expensive objects; he wants money itself. While the former obsession might reflect via market forces the values and desires of a larger community, the latter does not. On the contrary, if he happens to own something valued, he might sell it. Second, someone whose overwhelming motivation is money would be willing to pursue it by shameful or even illegal means.
Finally, even if market prices did reliably reflect evaluative judgments as opposed to base desires (which I doubt), the oligarch is never consciously considering their evaluative judgments as such. 87 There are familiar difficulties surrounding the issue of why the philosopher-kings pursue the good practically rather than just theoretically, which are related to the question of why they go back down in the cave. Such questions are beyond the scope of this paper, but see Richard Kraut, "Return to the 
